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the Army also transformed the theater-level commands, known as Army Service Component Commands (ASCCs), to a more capable headquarters and staff while adding certain subordinate, theater-enabling functions, as required by geographic region. With these changes, the geographical ASCCs transformed to theater army headquarters, but neither ASCCs nor theater armies are well understood by most in the U.S. Army. Adding to the confusion and misunderstanding, each theater is unique; therefore, the ASCCs are structured differently to meet the demands of a particular theater and Geographical Combatant Command. It is important to understand the roles and responsibilities of an ASCC and what are the differences compared to a theater army headquarters. Why do ASCCs exist? This will help to identify the challenges and organization shortfalls that still must be overcome to fully operate as a theater army headquarters.
Transforming the Army Service Component Command to a Theater Army
We must transform our force to provide the combatant commanders dominant, strategically responsive forces capable of meeting diverse challenges across the entire spectrum of 21 st century conflict.
-GEN George W. Casey, Jr. brigade command or near the end of their officer career. 2 Adding to the confusion and misunderstanding, each theater is unique, therefore, the ASCCs are structured differently to meet the demands of a particular theater and Geographical Combatant Command (GCC). 3 Additionally, theater-level command structure, duties, and responsibilities are not well documented with only two Army publications focused on ASCCs or theater armies. Army Regulation 10-87 outlines the missions, functions, and relationships at the Army command level, but it is limited in scope. 4 The main reference is the new Field Manual 3-93 Theater Army Operations which recently replaced FM 100-7 Decisive Operations: The Army in Theater Operations in October 2011. 5 It is important to understand the roles and responsibilities of an ASCC and what are the differences compared to a theater army headquarters. Why do ASCCs exist? This 2 paper will help to identify the challenges and organization shortfalls that still must be overcome to fully operate as a theater army headquarters. With the current rebalance in U.S. National Security Strategy to the Asia-Pacific with an increasingly complex environment, a deeper look at the U.S. Army Pacific Headquarters will assist in identifying and making recommendations and changes to: 1) the theater-level command relationships, 2) the ASCC/theater army command structure and capabilities, and 3)
select theater army staff sections and organization redesign, in order to provide relevant theater-wide support to the GCC. 6 The Army must respond to the future strategic operating environment and implement a strategy that best supports this challenging environment. The ASCC must be optimally organized to provide a robust theater army headquarters to meet the multiple demands of the GCC in peacetime and crisis.
U.S. Army Service Component Command
What is a U.S. Army Service Component Command? The ASCC is the senior Army service representative and headquarters in a theater reporting directly to the region's GCC. The ASCC headquarters is regionally focused and operates at the theater-strategic level. Each GCC requires an Army headquarters that directs the activities of theater-committed Army forces, and there is only one ASCC or senior Army headquarters within a combatant commander's Area of Responsibility (AOR). This Army headquarters includes the senior Army commander and all Army personnel, organizations, units, and installations assigned to the theater and GCC. 7 In addition, this The primary role of the ASCC to a GCC is organized into three categories: (1) daily operational requirements, (2) setting the theater, and (3) providing mission command. 10 The daily operational requirements include the Army's Title 10 USC responsibilities, executing the GCC's Theater Campaign Plan, supporting Theater Security Cooperation Plans, providing Army expertise in writing support plans to theater contingencies, and maintaining regionally-focused intelligence, leader engagements, and overall Army responsiveness. The second primary role of the ASCC is to set the theater which includes conducting ASOS and CUL responsibilities, conducting activities to ensure protection and access to ports, terminals, airfields, and bases within the AOR to support future contingency operations, conducting Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (RSOI) as required, and conducting theater-specific training.
Finally, the ASCC must have a mission command capability to respond immediately to crisis and direct operations, especially since it is the Army headquarters most familiar with the operating environment. 11 It must also be noted the ASCC commander serves as the principal advisor to the CCDR on support and employment of Army organizations and their capabilities in theater. 12 It is this role and relationship that represents the face of the U.S. Army to the CCDR.
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There are ten total U.S. Army service component commands in the U.S. Army.
There are six ASCC/theater armies that align with the six geographical combatant commands, and there are four functional ASCCs that align with a specific functional combatant command -each one organized slightly different including duties, responsibilities, and diverse general officer rank amongst each ASCC commanding general due to the level of capability and support required from one AOR to another. 13 The six geographical ASCCs are as follows: 27 Through transformation, the ASCC staff increased capability and depth, gaining unique attributes including regional expertise and language skills specific to the region. Today, the theater army conducts all tasks assigned to the ASCC through its non-deployable Main Command Post. Although ASCCs were required to provide a C/JTF or C/JFLCC capability to the GCC, only the 3 rd and 8 th Armies had the requisite structure until now. Overall, the theater army provides a regionally-oriented, long-term Changing leadership and headquarters during crisis execution creates an operational pause, disrupts established continuity, and requires a rapid learning curve for the newly deployed command. Third, today's operational environment does not guarantee forward regional access and does not support long timelines for deployment, as time is a critical factor in the decision cycle. With today's communications capabilities and operational reach, it is not a priority for a major headquarters to be forward deployed during every crisis. A corps headquarters must deploy into theater, establish C2 nodes, bring a significant logistics footprint, and ensure adequate infrastructure -all of which causes a time-delay in responsiveness. The Army must provide the best solution that is responsive to the GCC.
Joint doctrine lays out a theater-JFLCC option for the GCC. 48 The theater army design allows for a theater-JFLCC to coordinate with other theater-level functional components, provide general support to multiple Joint Operating Areas (JOAs) within the Asia-Pacific, conduct theater-level contingency planning, and conduct joint RSOI for the entire land force. 49 The military remains the security partner of choice, and USARPAC as the theater-JFLCC will continue to build and maintain creditability, confidence, and trust through persistent engagement with U.S. allies and partners. By, with, and through allies and partners is the best way to ensure peace and security in the Asia-Pacific. 51 USARPAC must provide the GCC a robust expeditionary command and control structure, which can help deter aggression, advance regional security and cooperation, respond to crisis, and fight to win.
Select Theater Army Staff Sections and Organization Redesign
USARPAC requires a theater-strategic primary staff focused on long-term objectives, with a robust battle staff to monitor the theater, synchronize operational activities, rapidly respond to crisis, and leverage the theater enabling commands.
Operating at the theater-strategic level, the staff must be driven by long-term goals and objectives, with a capability to focus near-term. The staff should be split between monitoring, assessing, and supervising operations, while the remaining staff conducts planning, analysis and assessments, and provides strategy and policy guidance.
However, the actual theater army headquarters staff structure in FM 3-93 is designed more towards a near-term focus at an operational level, rather than at a theaterstrategic level with a long-term focus. There are four major areas addressed as recommended changes to the current USARPAC Theater Army staff structure and intended to improve staff responsiveness, integration, efficiency, and function. The recommended changes cover the current overall theater army staff design, the Movement and Maneuver Cell design, the Contingency Command Post, and staff culture issues.
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In accordance with FM 3-93, the theater army headquarters staff structure is There is a culture problem that exists from years of tactical experience and command that does not translate well at the theater-strategic level. Operators who serve at the battalion and brigade command have difficulty employing a future operations and a plans staff. 57 These specialty staffs are almost non-existent at the tactical level, so many battalion and brigade commanders do not know how best to utilize these staffs. Separating the G-5 Plans Division from the G-3 will naturally fix the plans disconnect. However, future operations is an operations function, and cannot be separated from the G-3. USARPAC not to be the C2 of choice. I recommend the CCP term not be used to promote a capability that is already thought to exist inherent in an organization. It is like trying to sell a basic model automobile without any options just because the car dealership does not have the model with options on the showroom floor. The CCP is a great capability, but promoting it as a capability separate from the ASCC/theater army headquarters diminishes the command's overall reach-back status. 61 In general, it is better to use common terms and capabilities than to constantly explain what those names and organizations represent. As a subordinate headquarters and Army component to the GCC, the U.S. Army should not be inventing new naming conventions or concepts to further distance the two organizations, but should align with the GCC staff to ensure seamless coordination, synchronization, and enduring support.
Conclusion 28
Each GCC has an ASCC/theater army assigned to it, and it is organized to provide a regionally-oriented, long-term Army presence for peacetime military engagement, security cooperation, deterrence, and limited intervention operations.
Additionally, the theater army's primary roles include: 1) combatant commander's daily operations requirements, 2) setting the theater, and 3) providing mission command for immediate crisis response. However, the current ASCC/theater army design provides limited capability for mission command, which is insufficient to perform as a JTF or JLFCC headquarters for major operations within the AOR even though the GCC may designate the theater army headquarters as a theater-level JFLCC with command and control, protection, and sustainment responsibilities. To provide this capability directly would require a re-design of the current ASCC/theater army organization and structure.
The Army strategy for global mission command of Army forces relies on the modular corps headquarters to mission command major operations instead of theater armies, but there are limited numbers of corps headquarters regionally-focused on a daily basis.
The ASCC/theater army is the senior Army commander during daily operations, establishing working relationships with the combatant commander and other U.S.
services in theater, conducting theater security engagements, gaining regional expertise, and is responsible for all contingency planning. Known command and support relationships are the basis for unity of command and unity of effort in operations.
Therefore, as the primary Army headquarters in theater with established relationships, changing leadership and headquarters during crisis execution creates an operational pause, disrupts established continuity, and requires a rapid learning curve for the newly deployed command. The ASCC/theater army must optimally organize to provide a 29 robust headquarters to meet the multiple demands of the GCC in peacetime and crisis.
Transform to a new theater army structure that provides a theater-JFLCC-capable headquarters, immediately available, to meet all GCC requirements across the entire AOR. The operational/transformation concept of streamlined and integrated command and control capabilities by a headquarters -by design, regionally-focused to deftly
handle the complex and difficult problems from the strategic to operational levels -is truly challenging. Any staff restructuring without training or maturity amounts to reorganization with hollow effect. Therefore, the theater army staff structure must change to improve staff responsiveness, integration, efficiency, and function while aligning with the GCC staff.
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